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Abstract. The interest in attribute-based access control policies is in-
creasingly growing due to their ability to accommodate the complex secu-
rity requirements of modern computer systems. With this novel paradigm,
access control policies consist of attribute expressions which implicitly
describe the properties of subjects and protection objects and which must
be satisfied for a request to be allowed. Since specifying a policy in this
framework may be very complex, approaches for policy mining, i.e., for
inferring a specification automatically from examples in the form of logs
of authorized and denied requests, have been recently proposed.
In this work, we propose a multi-objective evolutionary approach for
solving the policy mining task. We designed and implemented a problem
representation suitable for evolutionary computation, along with several
search-optimizing features which have proven to be highly useful in this
context: a strategy for learning a policy by learning single rules, each one
focused on a subset of requests; a custom initialization of the population;
a scheme for diversity promotion and for early termination. We show that
our approach deals successfully with case studies of realistic complexity.
1 Introduction
Data are today one of the most strategic asset of any company and organization
and, as such, their protection from any kind of improper modifications or unau-
thorized disclosures is a fundamental service to be provided by any Data Man-
agement System. In a data management system, accesses are regulated through
access control policies [1] that are then encoded into a set of authorizations and
checked by the reference monitor, a trusted software module in charge of en-
forcing access control. Since the 1970s, several access control models for policy
specification have been proposed, including Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Role-based Access Control (RBAC). The
common characteristic of these models is that they are identity-based, that is,
access control is based on the identity of subjects and protection objects. These
models are not scalable and flexible and thus they do not fit very well in the
current scenario, characterized by open and distributed systems. Due to these
limitations the new Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) paradigm has re-
cently emerged [2]. The main advantage of ABAC is that the access control
process is not identity-based, rather it exploits attributes of the requestor and
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resource (e.g., the age of the requestor). Attribute expressions are then used to
implicitly denote the sets of users and resources to which a policy applies (e.g., a
nurse can add an item in a HR for a patient in the ward in which he/she works).
Clearly, the main advantage of ABAC is in terms of flexibility in the specification
of protection requirements. In contrast, the drawback is that policy specification
becomes more complex and can result in an expensive and time consuming task.
A promising approach to diminish the burden of policy specification is rep-
resented by policy mining, whose goal is to partially or totally automate the
construction of an ABAC policy from available access control information (e.g.,
access control logs, RBAC policies). Therefore, in this paper, we propose a multi-
objective evolutionary approach for learning ABAC policies from sets of autho-
rized and denied access requests. The approach is multi-objective because it aims
at learning a policy which, at the same time, is consistent with the input requests,
exhibits low complexity and does not use those attributes which uniquely rep-
resent user and resource identities, hence exploiting the true potential of the
ABAC paradigm.
The evolutionary approach here proposed includes several contributions: (i) a
domain-specific phenotypic representation, along with a set of custom genetic
operators, which allow individuals to represent valid policy rules in the ABAC
paradigm; (ii) an incremental strategy for learning a policy by learning single
rules, each one fitting a subset of requests—a form of separate-and-conquer;
(iii) a custom initialization of the population; (iv) a diversity promotion scheme;
and (v) an early termination criterion.
We experimentally evaluated our proposal on a set of realistic case studies
and found that it is always able to obtain a policy which meets the objectives.
We also assessed our solution in case of incomplete input—i.e., when the input
requests do not fully represent the access control information—and found that
it is robust to missing information rates up to 50%.
We would like to remark that the approach presented in this paper can also
be a valuable contribution in other security domains, besides policy mining, such
as the strategic one of emergency management. Indeed, one of the most widely
used approaches to deal with the information needs arising during emergency sit-
uations is the Break-the-Glass (BtG) paradigm [3], which allows users to override
access control decisions on demand by logging their accesses. The main issue with
BtG models is that they could bring the system to an unsafe state due to abuse
of BtG policies. An alternative and more secure way to deal with emergency
management, which has been recently proposed in [4], is to use a policy-based
approach, according to which a set of emergency policies are specified, overriding
regular ones during emergency situations. By properly extending the approach
presented in this paper, in terms of objectives to be met, emergency policies can
be learned from the BtG logs.
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2 Related work
The problem of deriving new ABAC policies from access request logs has been
first and only investigated in [5] (extended by [6]). The authors propose an
algorithm which incorporates some heuristics aimed at merging and simplifying
single rules. In this paper, we use the same ABAC language and the same case
studies of the cited papers: our method exhibits the same high effectiveness of
the method in [6, 5], which is not evolutionary. We think that our proposal could
be easier to extend—by incorporating new objectives to be met—in order to fit
more specific needs of similar scenarios, such as emergency policy learning from
BtG logs.
Other non-evolutionary approaches have been proposed for mining policies
from logs for less expressive access control models (e.g., RBAC [7, 8]). In some
cases, additional information, besides the request logs, is needed as training
data [9].
Usage of evolutionary techniques for inferring RBAC rules explaining the
observed actions in environments with tree-structured role hierarchies was pro-
posed in [10]. The aim of the proposal was using the inferred rules for identifying
mismatches between user roles and actual processes, as a tool for insider threat
detection. No actual assessment was provided. An exercise in security policy
inference through evolutionary techniques was proposed in [11]. This work con-
sidered rules based on boolean expressions constructed in a simple language and
applied Genetic Programming for discovering a single expression capturing all
the rules provided as examples. The case studies were composed of very few
examples and were mainly a proof-of-concept demonstrating the feasibility of
policy inference by means of Genetic Programming. We consider instead a full-
fledged security policy language capable of expressing attribute-based rules, and
demonstrate that our approach can indeed be applied successfully on realistic
testbeds.
An evolutionary framework for learning security policies which need to be
updated dynamically is proposed in [12]. This work introduces a stochastic risk-
based security policy model based on a few numerical or boolean variables and
uses this model for generating examples of access control decisions. These exam-
ples are then used for driving a Genetic Programming search aimed at inferring
a formula leading to the same decisions as those in the examples. The cited work
uses the SPEA2 multi objective evolutionary algorithm [13] for minimizing the
error rate and the size of each formula. Evolutionary multi-objective optimiza-
tion techniques have been applied in other security-related problems as a tool
for systematically coping with problem-specific constraints, e.g., performance
and usability in network reconfiguration strategies [14] and run-time efficiency
in deep packet inspection [15].
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3 Scenario
3.1 ABAC policy language
We consider the ABAC policy language defined in [5], which is stated to be,
according to the authors, significantly more complex than policy languages han-
dled in previous work on security policy mining. We briefly describe the language
below in order to provide the appropriate context for our work.
Let U be a set of users and AU a set of user attributes. The value of attribute
a ∈ AU for user u ∈ U is represented by a function dU (u, a). This function can
assume a special value ⊥ to indicate that the value of attribute a for user u is
undefined.
The set of user attributes AU can be partitioned in two sets: AU,1, contain-
ing single-valued attributes, and AU,∞ containing multi-valued attributes, i.e.,
attributes whose values are sets of single values. Set AU,1 includes a special
attribute uid which has a unique value (different from ⊥) for each user.
We denote with VU (a) the set of possible single values assumed by user
attribute a, i.e., the range of dU for a ∈ AU,1 and the union of the range elements
for a ∈ AU,∞.
Similarly, let R be a set of resources and AR a set of resource attributes. The
value of attribute a ∈ AR for resource r ∈ R is represented by a function dR(r, a),
which can assume a special value ⊥ to indicate that the value of attribute a
for resource r is undefined. The set AR can be partitioned in two sets AR,1
and AR,∞ containing single-valued and multi-valued attributes, respectively. Set
AR,1 includes a special attribute rid which has a unique value (different from ⊥)
for each resource. We denote with VR(a) the set of possible single values assumed
by resource attribute a.
Subsets of users and resources can be described by means of attribute expres-
sions, as follows. We denote by Set(S) the powerset of set S. A user attribute
expression is a function eU : AU → E, where E = Set(VU (a))∪> when a ∈ AU,1
(see below for the meaning of >) and E = Set(Set(VU (a)))∪> when a ∈ AU,∞.
We say that a user u satisfies a user attribute expression eU if and only if,
∀a ∈ AU,1, eU (a) = > ∨ eU (a) 3 dU (u, a) and ∀a ∈ AU,∞, eU (a) = > ∨ ∃s ∈
eU (a), dU (u, a) ⊇ s. In other words, > is used to indicate that attribute a is
irrelevant for determining whether a user satisfies user attribute expression eU
(i.e., eU (a) = >).
Resource attribute expressions are defined similarly, except that the satisfac-
tion criterion for multi-valued attributes requires equality rather than ⊇ (i.e.,
∃s ∈ e(a), dR(r, a) = s). The reason is because user attributes which are multi-
valued represent capabilities.
A constraint represents a relationship between users and resources which may
or may not be satisfied, as follows. A constraint c is a function c : AU × AR →
{¬>,>}. A pair composed of a user u and a resource r satisfies a constraint c
if and only if ∀aU ∈ AU,∞, aR ∈ AR,∞, c(aU , aR) = > ∨ dU (u, aU ) ⊇ dR(r, aR)
and ∀aU ∈ AU,∞, aR ∈ AR,1, c(aU , aR) = > ∨ dU (u, aU ) 3 dR(r, aR) and ∀aU ∈
AU,1, aR ∈ AR,1, c(aU , aR) = > ∨ dU (u, aU ) = dR(r, aR).
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A rule ρ is a tuple 〈eU , eR, O, c〉, where eU is an attribute expression, eR is a
resource expression, c is a constraint and O ⊆ O is a set of operations. A policy
P is a set of rules. Finally, an access request is a tuple 〈u, r, o〉 which means that
user u wants to perform the operation o ∈ O on the resource r.
An access request 〈u, r, o〉 is either accepted or denied by a rule ρ = 〈eU , eR, O,
c〉. The former occurs if and only if u satisfies eU , r satisfies eR, u, r satisfies c
and o ∈ O. An access request is accepted by a policy P if and only if the access
request is accepted by at least one rule in P , otherwise the access request is
denied by P . We denote with 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ and 〈u, r, o〉 |= P the acceptance of a
request 〈u, r, o〉 by a rule ρ or a policy P , respectively.
We describe attribute expressions and rules by means of the concrete syn-
tax proposed in [5] and outlined in the following example. Let us consider an
university domain in which AU,1 = {uid,position, isDean}, AU,∞ = {courses},
AR,1 = {rid, type, course}, AR,∞ = ∅ and O = {writeGrade, readGrade,deploy}.
A policy P may be composed of the following 4 rules:
ρ1 = 〈position = student, type = gradebook, {readGrade}, courses 3 course〉
ρ2 = 〈position = faculty, type = gradebook, {writeGrade, readGrade}, courses 3 course〉
ρ3 = 〈position ∈ faculty ∧ isDean = true, type = {gradebook}, {readGrade}, ∅〉
ρ4 = 〈courses ⊇ {{CS04}, {WD01}}, type = {testWebServer}, {deploy}, ∅〉
Rule ρ1 says that students can read the grades they got for their courses (i.e.,
those they attend); ρ2 says that faculty members can read and write grades for
their courses (i.e., those they teach); ρ3 says that the dean can read all grades;
ρ4 says that users whose courses include one among CS04 and WD01 can deploy
on the test web server. Note that ρ1 and ρ2 pose a constraint on the relationship
between the user and the resource, whereas ρ3 and ρ4 do not (i.e., for ρ3 and ρ4,
c(aU , aR) = >,∀aU ∈ AU , aR ∈ AR).
3.2 Problem statement
Let us consider two sets AU and AR of user and resource attributes along with
their possible values VU and VR, and the set O of operations which may be
applied to resources. The problem which we aim to solve consists in generating
a policy P which accepts all access requests in a specified set SA and denies all
access requests in another specified set SD. In other words, the problem consists
in inferring a policy consistent with specified examples of the desired behavior.
A problem instance is a tuple 〈SA, SD, AU , AR, VU , VR, dU , dR,O〉.
A trivial solution for every problem instance always exists in the form of
an Access Control List (ACL) policy. Such a policy may be constructed by
generating, for each request 〈u, r, o〉 ∈ SA, a rule ρ = 〈eU , eR, O, c〉 which accepts
only a request from user u to perform the operation o to resource r, using only
special attributes uid and rid. In other words, eU (a) = dU (u, a) if a = uid,
eU (a) = > otherwise; eR(a) = dR(r, a) if a = rid, eR(a) = > otherwise; O = {o};
and c(aU , aR) = >.
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In order to generate policies which not only are consistent but indeed gener-
alize beyond the provided examples by taking user and resource attributes into
account, we add two further requirements: (i) policy rules should use uid and
rid special attributes as little as possible and (ii) the complexity of the policy
should be minimized. We assess the complexity of a policy P with the weighted
structural complexity (WSC) [8]. WSC is a weighted sums of the complexity of
rule components (eU , eR, O and c)—see [5] for the details. In this paper we used,
without loss of generality, equal weights.
4 Our evolutionary approach
4.1 Overview
We propose an evolutionary approach for solving the policy generation problem.
Each individual represents a rule and we define custom genetic operators which
operate on rules and are guaranteed to generate valid rules. In other words,
we define a domain-specific phenotypic representation of candidate solutions
rather than adopting more general representations which would hardly fit this
application domain (e.g., trees as in Genetic Programming or numeric vectors
as in Genetic Algorithm).
We construct the required policy incrementally, by means of successive itera-
tions—a form of separate-and-conquer [16]. At each iteration we execute an
evolutionary search which generates one rule ρ? and then we drop from the set
SA of requests to be accepted those which are accepted by ρ
?. Each iteration
thus operates on a problem instance which differs from the problem instance at
the previous iteration—SA at the (i + 1)-th iteration being a subset of SA at
the i-th iteration. The procedure terminates when SA is empty. An intermedi-
ate policy is then constructed as the set of rules generated at each iteration.
Finally, the required policy is obtained from a further optimization applied to
the intermediate policy.
The evolutionary search includes further key contributions:
– We initialize the population based on the problem instance (in particular
using the requests in SA), rather than generating random individuals.
– We promote population diversity by imposing that no identical individuals
can be contained in the population.
– We use an early termination criterion based on counting how many times
the search would attempt to generate an individual which already exists.
4.2 Evolutionary search
An evolutionary search takes a problem instance 〈SA, SD, AU , AR, VU , VR, dU ,
dR,O〉 as input and produces a single rule ρ?. Each individual ρ is associated
with a counter cρ, initially set to 1, and with a fitness f(ρ), defined below. First,
an initial population of |SA| individuals (i.e., rules) is built. These individuals are
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generated from SA rather than randomly, as follows. For each request 〈u, r, o〉 ∈
SA a rule ρ = 〈eU , eR, O, c〉 is built such that:
eU (aU ) =
{
dU (u, aU ) if aU 6= uid ∧ dU (u, aU ) 6= ⊥ ∧ ∀aR ∈ AR, c(aU , aR) = >
> otherwise
eR(aR) =
{
dR(r, aR) if aR 6= rid ∧ dR(r, aR) 6= ⊥ ∧ ∀aU ∈ AU , c(aU , aR) = >
> otherwise
O = {o}
c(aU , aR) =

¬> if dU (u, aU ) 6= ⊥ ∧ dR(r, aR) 6= ⊥ ∧ dU (u, aU ) ⊇ dR(r, aR)
¬> else if dU (u, aU ) 6= ⊥ ∧ dR(r, aR) 6= ⊥ ∧ dU (u, aU ) 3 dR(r, aR)
¬> else if dU (u, aU ) 6= ⊥ ∧ dR(r, aR) 6= ⊥ ∧ dU (u, aU ) = dR(r, aR)
> otherwise
In practice, in order to build a rule ρ = 〈eU , eR, O, c〉 from the request 〈u, r, o〉
we first find the user and resource attributes which can be used to define the
constraint c; then, we set user and attribute expression eU and eR according to
the values of the respective u and r attributes; in doing so, we consider only
attributes which have not been used for defining c and we do not use either uid
or rid.
With reference to the university domain example in Section 3.1, let us con-
sider the following request in SA:
u = 〈uid = stud111013,position = student, courses = {CS01,CS03}〉
r = 〈rid = gradebook7211, type = gradebook, course = CS03〉
o = readGrade
The rule generated from this request will be:
ρ = 〈position = student, type = gradebook, {readGrade}, courses 3 course〉
Note that c(courses, course) = ¬> because dU (u, courses) = {CS01,CS03} 3
CS03 = dR(r, course).
Having generated the initial population, we execute the following iterative
procedure:
1. Choose randomly whether to apply a mutation operator or a crossover op-
erator; the choice between the two options is made with probability pmutation
and 1− pmutation, respectively.
2. Choose randomly the specific operator within the chosen category with uni-
form probability—we defined 10 mutation operators and 5 crossover opera-
tors.
3. If a mutation operator has been chosen, then select one rule in the current
population, otherwise (a crossover operation has been chosen) select two
rules; each rule selection is made by picking ntournament rules at random and
then selecting the best one.
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4. Generate a new rule ρ′ with the chosen genetic operator applied to the
chosen rule(s); if the current population does not already contain a rule
ρ = ρ′, then add ρ′ to the current population and evaluate its fitness f(ρ);
otherwise, increment counter cρ by one and discard ρ
′.
5. If the current population size is greater than npop, then iteratively remove
the worst rule until the population size is equal to npop.
The iterative procedure terminates when one of the following holds: (a) a prede-
fined number neval of fitness evaluations has been performed, or (b) the counter
cρ? of the best rule ρ
? is larger than a predefined number nstop. At the end,
the best rule ρ? in the current population is the result of the search. Note that
the fitness of generated rules are evaluated only when they are different from all
existing—and hence already evaluated—rules (step 4).
We defined 10 mutation operators and 5 crossover operators. Their full de-
scription is not included in this paper for space constraints but is available
separately3. For example, we defined a constraint donation crossover opera-
tor as follows: let ρ1 = 〈eU,1, eR,1, O1, c1〉 and ρ2 = 〈eU,2, eR,2, O2, c2〉 be the
parent rules. The rule ρ = 〈eU , eR, O, c〉 generated by the operator is initially
set to ρ = ρ1; next, a pair aU , aR ∈ AU × AR is randomly chosen such that
c1(aU , aR) = > ∧ c2(aU , aR) = ¬>; finally, c(aU , aR) := c2(aU , aR).
The fitness f(ρ) of a rule ρ is defined as a tuple composed of 4 numbers:
f(ρ) = 〈FAR(ρ),FRR(ρ), ID(ρ),WSC(ρ)〉, where FAR and FRR are the False
Acceptance Rate on the requests in SD and the False Rejection Rate on the
requests in SA, respectively; ID(ρ) is a measure of the usage of the special at-
tributes uid and rid; WSC(ρ) is the WSC index defined in Section 3.2. In detail:
FAR(ρ) =
|{〈u, r, o〉 ∈ SD, 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ}|
|SD|
FRR(ρ) =
|{〈u, r, o〉 ∈ SA, 〈u, r, o〉 6 |=ρ}|
|SA|
ID(ρ) =

2 if eU (uid) 6= > ∧ eR(rid) 6= >
1 if eU (uid) 6= > Y eR(rid) 6= >
0 otherwise
For all the elements of the fitness tuple, the lower the better.
Rules are ranked basing on lexicographical order of their fitnesses f(ρ): the
rule with lower FAR is considered the best; in case two or more have the same
lowest FAR, the rule with lowest FRR is considered the best; in case two or more
have the same lowest FRR, the rule with lowest ID is considered the best; in case
two or more have the same lowest ID, the rule with lowest WSC is considered
the best. This method of ranking solutions in a multi-objective problem where
objectives are sorted by decreasing importance is also known as multi-layered
fitness [17]. In our case, in the fitness f(ρ) = 〈FAR(ρ),FRR(ρ), ID(ρ),WSC(ρ)〉,
3 http://machinelearning.inginf.units.it/data-and-tools/appendices/2014-EMO-
EvolutionaryABACInference-Appendix.pdf
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the first two components represent the ability of the rule to be consistent with the
problem instance, whereas the other two reflect the further problem objectives
concerning use of special attributes and complexity (see Section 3.2).
4.3 Incremental strategy
We construct the required policy incrementally, by means of successive evolu-
tionary searches, as follows. Initially, let P = ∅ and S′A = SA, then:
1. execute an evolutionary search (Section 4.2) on problem instance 〈S′A, SD,
AU , AR, VU , VR, dU , dR,O〉 and obtain ρ?;
2. if FAR(ρ?) = 0 and FRR(ρ?) < 1 then P := P ∪ {ρ?}, otherwise terminate;
3. assign S′A = SA \ {〈u, r, o〉 ∈ SA, 〈u, r, o〉 |= P};
4. if S′A = ∅, terminate.
In other words, at each iteration we obtain a new rule ρ? (step 1). As long as
this new rule accepts at least one request in S′A (step 2, FRR(ρ
?) < 1) while not
accepting any request in SD (FAR(ρ
?) = 0), the new rule is added to the policy
being constructed and the iteration continues. The next iteration will operate
on a smaller S′A, which does not contains any request accepted by the current
policy, including ρ? (step 3). In case all requests to be accepted are already
accepted by the current policy, the iteration terminates (step 4).
Since each ρ ∈ P has FAR(ρ) = 0—see step 2 above—and since a request
is accepted if at least one rule in P accepts it, it follows that FAR(P ) = 0
and ∀ρ ∈ P,FRR(P ) ≤ FRR(ρ), where FRR and FAR are defined for policy P
similarly to for requests.
The (intermediate) policy P obtained by the above procedure is optimized
further by executing the following procedure for a predefined number of neval
iterations:
1. choose a rule ρ in P at random;
2. generate a new rule ρ′ by applying a randomly selected mutation operator
on ρ;
3. build a policy P ′ by replacing ρ with ρ′ in P ;
4. if P ′ is better than P , than P := P ′.
The comparison criterion between two policies P1, P2 is based on the same lex-
icographical order used for rules: the policy with lowest FAR is considered the
best; otherwise, the policy with lowest FRR is best; otherwise, the policy with
lowest ID is best (where ID(P ) =
∑
ρ∈P ID(ρ)); otherwise, the policy with lowest
WSC is best.
We chose to use a lexicographical order (both for rules and policies) because
it reflects the order of in which the problem objectives are defined (consistency
first, then use of special attributes, then complexity). Moreover, concerning con-
istency, we chose to favor—i.e., minimizing first—FAR instead of FRR because
of the way we compose a policy starting from rules: in particular, we aim at
obtaining rules with FAR = 0 (see the condition in step 2 above).
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5 Experimental evaluation
We evaluated our proposal experimentally on the same case studies considered
in [5]. Each case study consists of a set of users U , a set of resources R and a set of
rules P0. Users and resources are associated with various attributes. Rules were
carefully constructed to express non-trivial policies and exercise all the features
of the policy language, including use of set membership and superset relations
in attribute expressions and constraints. The experimental data consist of 7 case
studies: 4 of them were hand-crafted and 3 of them were synthetically generated
from the hand-crafted ones. The synthetic case studies include a much larger
number of users and resources. Table 1 summarizes the case studies. The set of
operations O is obtained from P0 as O =
⋃
〈eU ,eR,O,c〉∈P0 O. The set of requests
includes all possible requests, i.e., S = U × R × O; this set is then partitioned
in SA and SD, basing on whether each request in S was accepted or denied by
P0, respectively.
Case study |P0| |U | |R| |O| |AU | |AR| |SA| |SD| WSC(P0)
Healthcare 9 21 16 3 6 7 51 957 33
Online video 6 12 13 1 3 3 78 78 20
Project management 11 19 40 7 8 6 189 5131 49
University 10 22 34 9 6 5 168 6564 37
Healthcare† 9 1600 5760 3 6 7 10 097 27 637 903 33
Project management† 11 800 1600 7 8 6 7680 8 952 320 49
University† 10 1320 2520 9 6 5 148 624 29 788 976 37
Table 1. Salient information about the hand-crafted (above) and synthetic (below,
with a † suffix) case studies.
We executed our approach on each case study for several values of the neval
parameter. We repeated each experiment 3 times for each neval value, with
different random seeds. We set the other parameters as follows: npop = 100,
ntournament = 3, nstop = 100 and pmutation = 0.5—we verified experimentally
that reasonable variations in these values do not cause significant variations in
the results.
Since the synthetic case studies are associated with several millions of re-
quests to be denied, in these cases we generated the corresponding policies based
on a random sample S∗D of those requests such that |S∗D| = 5|SA|. The results
in terms of FRR and FAR have always been computed on the full set, though.
Table 2 presents the results, averaged across the executions with different
random seeds, in terms of FRR(P ), FAR(P ) and WSC(P0)WSC(P ) ; the table also shows
the actual number nˆeval of fitness evaluations—recall that the number of itera-
tions of the incremental strategy is not known in advance—and the execution
time.
The first crucial finding is that our approach indeed succeeds in generating
consistent policies, i.e., policies with FRR(P ) = 0, FAR(P ) = 0. Moreover, we
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Case study neval FRR(P ) FAR(P )
WSC(P0)
WSC(P )
nˆeval t [s]
Healthcare
500 0 0 1.07 5536 1.2
2500 0 0 1.18 19 776 4
5000 0 0 1.18 22 691 5.3
Online video
500 0 0 1 2768 0.6
2500 0 0 1 5215 0.8
5000 0 0 1 7715 1.1
Project
management
500 0 0 0.96 6646 3.5
2500 0 0 1.06 24 368 14.7
5000 0 0 1.06 27 791 22.2
University
500 0 0 0.95 5904 3.1
2500 0 0 0.98 22 846 14.1
5000 0 0 1 26 487 21.8
Healthcare†
500 0 0 1.18 23 704 228.4
2500 0 0 1.2 33 864 398.9
5000 0 0 1.2 36 364 511.9
Project
management†
500 0 0 0.92 35 037 241.7
2500 0 0 1.06 45 591 626.9
5000 0 0 1.06 49 549 790
University†
500 0 0 0.89 35 822 1688.8
2500 0 0 1 52 513 3525.4
5000 0 0 1 56 718 4784.9
Table 2. Results.
verified that our method never produced policies which use special attributes
uid and rid, as desired.
Another important result is that our approach definitely tends to generate
a policy which is less complex than the baseline: in most cases WSC(P ) is not
larger than the WSC(P0) (we remark that P0 is unknown to our approach).
This effect is more apparent for Healthcare and Project management and the
corresponding synthetic versions, but can be observed also for University and its
synthetic counterpart, for sufficiently large values of neval. In other words, our
approach aims at obtaining the least complex policy which is consistent with the
desired behavior in terms of SA, SD; as it turns out, the generated policy tends
to be less redundant than the baseline policy.
The average execution time for generating a policy is in the order of seconds
for the hand-crafted case studies and in the order of minutes or a few tens of
minutes for the synthetic ones. It seems reasonable to claim that the computa-
tional load is fully practical for this application domain. The experiments have
been executed with a single-threaded Java prototype implementation on a quad-
core Intel CPU 2.50 GHz with 8 GB RAM. As expected, the execution time is
roughly linear with nˆeval|SA||SD|; with respect to neval, it can be seen that time
is slightly sublinear due to the intervention of the early termination criterion
given by nstop.
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5.1 Results with incomplete input
We wanted to gain insights in our method effectiveness when the input informa-
tion is incomplete. In particular, we considered the case where the input requests
sets SA and SD do not contain all the requests.
To this end, we repeated the experimental procedure detailed in the previous
section, by removing, before applying our method, a random portion γ of requests
in SA and SD. The performance in terms of FRR and FAR has obviously been
computed on full SA and SD. We repeated each experiment 3 times—i.e., with
3 different SA, SD and random seeds—for each value of γ.
The corresponding results are in Figure 1 (we executed these experiments
only on the hand-crafted case studies). It can be seen that the removal of part
of requests has little or no impact on FAR, even for large values of γ. Indeed,
FAR is always 0 when γ ≤ 0.25 and remains low (≤ 1%) even when half of
the requests in SD are not available for inferring the policy. The impact of the
removal of part of requests is slightly higher on FRR, but always lower than 4%.
We believe the reason is because our approach tends to produce a policy which
contains only the rules which are needed to accept all the requests contained in
the input SA. This interpretation is supported by the values of
WSC(P0)
WSC(P ) , which
become larger with large values of γ: in other words, our approach produces the
least complex policy which is consistent with the input.
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Fig. 1. Results with incomplete input.
5.2 Assessment of the contributions
We wanted to assess the specific impact of our key contributions described in
Section 4.1: population initialization from requests in SA, incremental strategy,
diversity promotion and early termination. Rather than assessing all combi-
nations, we executed pairwise comparisons between the full approach and the
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approach with one of these contributions disabled—note that disabling the di-
versity promotion implies disabling also the early termination. We considered
only the hand-crafted case studies.
Concerning the population initialization from the examples in SA, we experi-
mented with random creation of individuals in the initial population. It was clear
from the early experiments that generating a consistent policy from a random
initial population is very difficult. For this reason, we investigated the impact of
increasing the population size npop = 100 by an order of magnitude (1000, 2000)
and disabled early termination. Table 3 shows the results obtained with random
population initialization (for ease of comparison we provide the corresponding
results of the full method previously shown in Table 2). It is clear that the pop-
ulation initialization from SA is an essential ingredient for generating consistent
policies and greatly improves the method effectiveness. Table 3 shows that, if
one favors the exploration ability of the evolutionary search by increasing npop
and neval, the method can indeed obtain better solutions also with random ini-
tialization. These improved results are still far from those with the initialization
from SA, though, despite the increased execution time.
Healthcare Online video Proj. man. University
Pop. init. neval npop FRR(P ) t[s] FRR(P ) t[s] FRR(P ) t[s] FRR(P ) t[s]
From SA 5000 100 0 5.3 0 1.1 0 22.2 0 21.8
Random
5000 100 37.3 5.5 3.4 7.1 56.6 11.4 73.4 9.1
25 000 100 32.7 28.2 1.7 37.2 53.1 61.8 69.4 49.1
25 000 1000 5.2 203.7 0 300.8 38.4 224.7 9.5 276.5
25 000 2000 2.6 432.1 0 642.0 34.9 394.1 36.1 387.9
Table 3. Results with and without the population initialization from SA.
Concerning the incremental strategy, we executed a single evolutionary search
followed by the final optimization step executed with neval = 5000—results with
larger values for neval are essentially the same. The results in terms of FRR are
significantly worse than with the incremental strategy enabled: 82.4%, 53.9%,
83.1% and 74.6% for the Healthcare, Online video, Project management and
University case studies respectively, as opposed to FRR = 0. In other words, a
single evolutionary search is not able to generate a rule capable of accepting all
the requests in SA and denying all the requests in SD.
Concerning diversity promotion, we experimented without this contribution
and neval = 5000. We found that our approach still generates consistent policies
(i.e., with FAR = FRR = 0), but with larger complexity: WSC(P0)WSC(P ) is lower than
with the diversity promotion for the Healthcare and Project management case
studies: 1.15 vs. 1.18 and 1.01 vs. 1.06, respectively.
Concerning the early termination criterion, we experimented by stopping
the evolutionary search after having performed neval = 5000 fitness evaluations
irrespective of the number of times the search attempts to generate identical
individuals. The quality of the results is unaffected, the only impact being on
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execution times which are, on the average, 128% longer than with early termi-
nation enabled.
Finally, we investigated on the effectiveness of the further optimization of
the policy P which we perform at the end of the incremental strategy (see
Section 4.3). To this end, we experimented without this step. We found that
this procedure impacts on the complexity of the generated policies: WSC(P0)WSC(P )
is equal to 1.18, 0.91, 1.04 and 0.98 for the Healthcare, Online video, Project
management and University case studies respectively, as opposed to 1.18, 1, 1.06
and 1, with the optimization. By looking at the raw data, we found that the
optimization makes our approach cope with those cases where a rule ρ1, which
has been generated at a given iteration of the incremental strategy, could be
made less complex because of a rule ρ2 generated later, which accepts some
requests accepted also by ρ1.
6 Concluding remarks and future work
We have proposed an evolutionary approach for performing mining of ABAC
policies. The approach is based on the design and implementation of a domain-
specific phenotypic representation, along with the corresponding genetic oper-
ators, which allow attacking ABAC policy mining by means of evolutionary
computation. We used a multi-objective optimization framework based on a lex-
icographic criterion, in which we incorporate requirements on correctness (FAR,
FRR) and on expressiveness (WSC, usage of uid and rid). We incorporated in
the search several optimizations that have proven to be essential for this task, in
particular, we defined a strategy for building a policy incrementally, by learning
single rules each one on a different subset of the requests. We showed that our
approach deals successfully with case studies of realistic complexity, being highly
robust even in scenarios where the access requests available for learning do not
fully represent the access control information. We believe that our proposal may
indeed form the basis for a practical implementation of ABAC policy mining and
we intend to extend the scope of our investigation to emergency management.
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